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Clerk of the Utah Court of Appeals 
230 South 500 East, #400 
Salt Lake City, UT 84102 
RE: John Call Engineering, Inc. v. Manti City 
Case No. 89-0384CA 
Dear Clerk: 
Pursuant to Rule 24 (j) of the Rules of the Utah Court 
of Appeals, appellant John Call Engineering, Inc. submits the 
following additional authority that supplements Point I of 
Appellant's Brief. The Utah Supreme Court in Golding v. Ashley 





That a responsive pleading must set forth any and 
all applicable affirmative defenses; 
Any affirmative defense 
pleading are waived; and 
not set forth in 
A moving party is entitled to an order striking 
any affirmative defenses not pled. 
A copy of the case is attached to this letter. 
Sincerely, 
ROBERT/J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES 
ROBERT J. DEBRY 
RJD\jn 
Enclosure 
Paul R. Frischknecht 
50 North Main Street 
Manti, UT 84642 
cc: 
COD! • C O 
Hrovo. Utah 
Golding v. Ashlev Central Irrigation Co. 
133 Utah Adx Rep 3 
Cite as 
133 Ulah Adv. Rep. 3 
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
Gerald GOLDING, individually, and as 
representative of the heirs of Randal Golding, 
deceased, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
v. 
ASHLEY CENTRAL IRRIGATION 
COMPANY, a Utah corporation, 
Defendant and Appellee. 
No. 880025 
FILED: April 23, 1990 
Seventh District, Uintah County, 
Honorable Dennis L. Draney 
ATTORNEYS: 
Richard I. Ashton, David A. Wilde, Murray, 
for appellant 
Clark B. Allred, Gayle F. McKeachnie, 
Vernal, for appellee 
This opinion is subject to revision before 
publication in the Pacific Reporter. 
ZIMMERMAN, Justice: 
Gerald Golding appeals from the grant of a 
motion by defendant Ashley Central Irrigation 
Company for judgment on the pleadings and 
the consequent dismissal of Golding's wron-
gful death action against the irrigation 
company. Golding asserts that the trial court 
erred in concluding (i) that the Limitation of 
Landowner Liability Act ("the Act") applied 
to the facts of this case, thereby shielding the 
irrigation company from liability for neglig-
ence, and (ii) that the complaint did not ade-
quately allege a "willful or malicious failure to 
guard or warn against a dangerous condition" 
on its property that would permit Golding to 
recover under section 57-14-6 of the Act. 
We conclude that the pleadings are insufficient 
to demonstrate that the Act's protections are 
available to the irrigation company. Therefore, 
we reverse and remand to the trial court for 
further proceedings. 
The grant of a motion for judgment on the 
pleadings is reviewed under the same standard 
as the grant of a motion to dismiss, i.e., we 
affirm the grant of such a motion only if, as a 
matter of law, the plaintiff could not recover 
under the facts alleged. And in considering the 
factual allegations in the complaint, we take 
them as true and consider them and all reas-
onable inferences drawn therefrom in a light 
most favorable to the plaintiff. E.g., Lowe v. 
Sorcmon Research Co., 779 P.2d 668, 669, 
(Utah 1989); Arrow Indus., Inc. v. Zions First 
Natl Bank, 767 P.2d 935, 936 (Utah 1988). 
The facts are stated here in accordance with 
this standard of review. See, e.g., State v. 
Verde, 770 P.2d 116, 117 (Utah 1989). 
On June 25, 1986, Randal Golding, seven-
teen, and four teenaged friends went swim-
ming in an irrigation canal owned by Ashley 
Central Irrigation Company. There were no 
warnings posted of any dangers posed by 
swimming in the canal. While swimming, one 
of the boys went over a spillway and became 
trapped in the backwash created at the 
bottom. Jumping in to save his friend, Randal 
was caught in the backwash and swept under 
the surface. He was found approximately 150 
feet downstream from the spillway some 
twenty minutes later. He died two days later. 
Randal's father, Gerald Golding, filed an 
action against the irrigation company in June 
1987 for wrongful death. The complaint was 
couched in negligence terminology and alleged 
basically that the irrigation company failed to 
properly maintain its waterways and post 
warnings. The irrigation company answered in 
July 1987, denying all claims and alleging as a 
defense, inter alia, that the complaint "failed 
to state a claim upon which relief could be 
granted." It then filed a motion for judgment 
on the pleadings. As a ground for the motion, 
the irrigation company raised for the first time 
a claim that because the boys were using the 
canal for recreational purposes, any cause of 
action against the irrigation company sounding 
in mere negligence was barred under the 
Limitation of Landowner Liability Act. See 
Utah Code Ann. §§57-14-1 to-7 (1986) 
(amended in part 1987 & 1988).1 Golding filed 
a memorandum in opposition, arguing that the 
irrigation company could not claim the prot-
ection of the Act for a number of reasons, but 
he did not raise the argument that the irriga-
tion company had waived the defense of the 
Act by not asserting it in its answer. Alterna-
tively, Golding contended that even if the Act 
were applicable, the allegations of the compl-
aint were sufficient to state a claim under 
section 57-14-6(1) of the Act, which prov-
ides, "Nothing in this act limits in any way 
any liability which otherwise exists ... for 
willful or malicious failure to guard or warn 
against a dangerous condition, use, structure, 
or activity ...." Utah Code Ann. §57-14-6 
(1986) (amended 1988). 
The court granted the irrigation company's 
motion for judgment on the pleadings. It held 
that the Act applied and that Golding's 
complaint did not allege a willful or malicious 
failure to warn which would bring the action 
under section 57-14-6. The case was 
ordered dismissed. Golding appealed. 
Before addressing the merits of the appeal, 
we address the pleading and the procedure 
that led to the ruling below, because it raises a 
practice issue of general concern to the courts 
and bar. Had Golding timely moved, he would 
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have been entitled to an order striking that 
portion of the motion for judgment on the 
pleadings that relied on the Act as a defense to 
any negligence claim. Utah Rule of Civil 
Procedure 12(b) provides that any defense 
shall be asserted in a responsive pleading. 
Utah R. Civ. P. 12(b). Utah Rule of Civil 
Procedure 8(c) provides that a responsive 
pleading must set forth any matter 
"constituting an avoidance or affirmative 
defense." And rule 12(h) provides that a party 
"waives all defenses ... which [he or she] does 
not present either by motion ... or ... in his 
[or her] answer or reply ...." The Act certainly 
constitutes an "affirmative defense" or an 
"avoidance," inasmuch as it denies liability not 
because the allegations of the complaint are 
not true, but because the legislature is claimed 
to have relieved the irrigation company of the 
liability usually associated with negligence. 
Therefore, to preserve the Act as a defense, it 
had to be raised in the irrigation company's 
answer. Valley Bank & Trust Co. v. Wilken, 
668 P.2d 493, 493-94 (Utah 1983); Utah R. 
Civ. P. 8(c). 
Here, defendant's responsive pleading was 
its answer, and that pleading did not mention 
the Act. It only asserted, in the general terms 
of rule 12(b)(6), that the complaint failed to 
state a claim upon which relief could be 
granted. Although such a defense is commonly 
pleaded in Utah as a matter of form and 
counsel for the irrigation company may have 
thought that by putting a 12(b)(6) statement in 
the answer he had preserved the question of 
the Act's applicability, such a generally 
pleaded defense adds nothing to an answer 
because it gives no notice of the substance of 
the defense. See generally Utah R. Civ. P. 
8(b), (c), (e). Therefore, because the irrigation 
company did not properly preserve the Act as 
a defense, it was waived and plaintiff was 
entitled to object to its being raised in the 
motion for judgment on the pleadings. 
However, by not objecting, the plaintiff, in 
turn, waived this defective mode of placing the 
Act in issue. See Lewis v. Porter, 556 P.2d 
496, 497 (Utah 1976). We therefore address 
the question of the Act's applicability. 
The Act's applicability can be determined 
by reference to a decision of this court handed 
down after completion of the briefing of the 
instant appeal. In Crawford v. Tilley, 780 
P.2d 1248 (Utah 1989), the trial court found 
that the Act freed the owner of a cabin with a 
negligently maintained wall heater from liab-
ility when sued by the parents of a young 
hunter who had been asphyxiated.2 The cabin 
was located in a private development which 
was not made available to the public for rec-
reational use and had locked entry gates on 
the roads but was not fenced or posted against 
trespassing. The cabin owners contended that 
under section 57-14-3 of the Act, owners of 
any property are freed from a duty of ordi-
nary care to recreational users to maintain 
their property in a safe condition or warn of 
hazards. We rejected this contention and held 
that the Act was inapplicable under the Cra-
wford facts. 
In the Crawford opinion, we delved into the 
background of the Act and found that the 
purpose of these provisions and of the provi-
sions in section 57-14-3 and 57-14-4 that 
specifically limit the common law liability of a 
landowner who "directly or indirectly invites 
or permits" non-paying recreational use of its 
land to any such recreational users is "to 
promote the opening of private lands to public 
recreational use." 780 P.2d at 1250-51. We 
concluded that it would be inconsistent with 
this purpose to extend the protections of the 
Act to landowners "who actively discourage or 
preclude public access to their property." Id. 
Crawford, therefore, held that before a land-
owner could qualify for the limitations on 
common law liability, it must show that it has 
"made [its] property available to at least some 
members of the general public for recreational 
purposes." 780 P.2d at 1251; see Butler, Out-
door Sports and Torts: An Analysis of 
Utah's Recreational Use Act, 1988 Utah L. 
Rev. 47, 71-76 [hereinafter Butler]. 
Turning to the present case, the district 
court did not have the benefit of Crawford 
when presented with the irrigation company's 
motion. In granting that motion, the court 
held only that the provisions of the Act were 
applicable; it did not discuss the basis for that 
determination. Because Crawford teaches that 
the owner must have made the property avai-
lable for recreational use to obtain the Act's 
protection, and because the record contains no 
evidence from which such a determination can 
be made, the irrigation company has not 
shown that it qualifies for the Act's limitat-
ions on liability. The district court's decision 
on the Act's applicability must be reversed 
and the case remanded for further proceedings 
on that question under the guidance of Cra-
wford. 
Should the trial court find the Act applic-
able, it will have to address the question of 
whether the allegations of the complaint are 
sufficient to satisfy section 57-14-6's pres-
ervation of liability for willful or malicious 
conduct. Because the issue has been fully 
briefed here and may well be presented on 
remand, we will discuss the trial court's 
finding that Golding's complaint contained no 
allegation of "willful or malicious failure to 
guard or warn against any condition existing 
in, on or about the canal." Such a step is 
appropriate under our rules. R. Utah S. Ct. 
30(a); see Hiltsley v. Ryder, 738 P.2d 1024, 
1026 (Utah 1987) (Zimmerman, J., concur-
ring); Anderson v. Utah County Bd. of 
County Comm'rs, 589 P.2d 1214, 1216 (Utah 
1979); Salt Lake County v. Salt Lake City, 
570 P.2d 119, 121 (Utah 1977); Lopes v. 
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Lopes, 30 Utah 2d 393, 395, 518 P.2d 687, 
688 (1974); LcGrand Johnson Corp. v. Pete-
rson, 18 Utah 2d 260, 263, 420 P.2d 615, 617 
(1966). 
We have not had occasion to construe 
section 57-14-6 or to determine what is 
necessary to satisfy its requirements. The 
leading article on the Utah Act says that 
analogous provisions in other similar state acts 
have often been referred to as imposing a duty 
on landowners toward recreational users 
falling under the statute that is "analogous to 
a landowner's duty toward an unknown tres-
passer at common law." Butler, at 95. In Ewell 
v. United States, 579 F. Supp. 1291 (D. 
Utah 1984), aff'd, 776 F.2d 246 (10th Cir. 
1985), the federal district court addressed the 
Utah Act. While it did not address the duty 
imposed by Utah trespass law, it did note that 
one reading we had given to the terms "willful 
misconduct" and "willful and malicious" in 
other contexts was "'the intentional failure to 
do an act, with knowledge that serious injury 
is the probable result.'" Id. at 1295 (quoting 
Brown v. Frandsen, 19 Utah 2d 116, 117, 426 
P.2d 1021, 1022 (1967)) (defining "willful 
misconduct"). Another reading we have given 
the terms noted is "'such gross neglect of duty 
as to evince a reckless indifference of the 
rights of others on the part of the wrongdoer, 
and an entire want of care so as to raise the 
presumption that the person at fault is cons-
cious of the consequences of his careless-
ness.'" Id. at 1295-96 (quoting Clayton v. 
Crossroads Equip. Co., 655 P.2d 1125, 1131 
(Utah 1982)) (dictum relying on non-Utah 
sources equating "willful and malicious" with 
"gross negligence" or "reckless indifference"). 
But see At kin Wright & Miles v. Mountain 
States Tel. and Tel. Co., 709 P.2d 330, 335 
(Utah 1985) (dictum defining "willful misco-
nduct" as one step beyond "gross negligence," 
which is defined as "reckless indifference," in 
that "a defendant must be aware that his 
conduct will probably result in injury"). The 
federal court also noted that Prosser describes 
"willful or wanton misconduct" as "an aggr-
avated form of negligence, different in quality 
rather than degree from ordinary lack of 
care." Id. at 1296 (quoting W. Prosser, Law 
of Torts §34, at 184 (4th ed. 1971)). The 
federal district court did not attempt to reco-
ncile any conflict in the Utah cases, but simply 
found the complaint insufficient to allege the 
degree of "intent, knowledge or reckless indi-
fference ... of any dangerous condition" req-
uired by section 57-14-6. 
According to Butler, the standard quoted by 
the federal court from Brown v. Frandsen, 
which incorporates the elements of knowledge 
of the dangerous condition and of the fact 
that serious injury is a probable result, and 
inaction in the face of such knowledge, is 
consistent with Utah case law, with the Act's 
legislative history, and with the decisions of a 
majority of courts that has addressed analo-
gous recreational use statutes. Butler, at 95-
96. We also note that it is consistent with our 
statement in Atkin Wright & Miles and not 
obviously inconsistent with the general law 
regarding the duties of a landowner to tresp-
assers, which has never been spelled out in 
Utah in great detail. See, e.g., Tjas v. Proctor, 
591 P.2d 438, 441 (Utah 1979); Stevens v. Salt 
Lake County, 25 Utah 2d 168, 478 P.2d 496 
(1970); In re Wimmer's Estate, 111 Utah 444, 
182 P.2d 119 (1947); Zillman, Utah Tort Law 
40-42 (1987). We, therefore, are inclined to 
adopt the interpretation of the term "willful or 
malicious" in section 57-14-6 suggested by 
Butler. 
Applying that standard to the facts of the 
instant case, we conclude that these three ele-
ments are not alleged. Paragraph 11(e) states: 
Defendant breached the duty of 
care owed to Plaintiff and was 
negligent in at least the follow [sic] 
particulars!:] 
... , 
(e) in failing to take reasonable 
action to protect the public in the 
face of knowledge and information 
that its canals, ditches, spillways 
and waterways were unreasonably 
dangerous to life and limb .... 
Nothing in the quoted allegations avers a 
knowledge of a dangerous condition, a kno-
wledge that serious injury is the probable 
result of contact with the condition, or a 
failure to take any action in the face of this 
knowledge. Golding's allegation is only of a 
failure to take "reasonable" action to protect 
the public in the face of knowledge of an 
unreasonably dangerous condition. This is an 
allegation of negligence only.3 Therefore, if 
the Act is found to apply here, the allegations 
of the complaint, as presently framed, are 
insufficient to bring it within section 57-14-
6. 
On the other hand, if the trial court finds 
that the Act does not apply because the pro-
perty was not made available by the irrigation 
company for public recreation by directly or 
indirectly inviting or permitting that use, the 
court must then determine whether the com-
plaint alleges a common law cause of action 
for negligence, an issue that has not been 
briefed and to which we see no reason to 
speak. 
We reverse and remand to the trial court to 
determine the Act's applicability and to 
proceed further in accordance with this 
opinion. 
WE CONCUR: 
Gordon R. Hall, Chief Justice 
Richard C. Howe, Associate Chief Justice 
Christine M. Durham, Justice 
Stewart, Justice, concurs in the result. 
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1. These sections provide in pertinent part: 
57-14-1. Legislative purpose. 
The purpose of this act is to encou-
rage owners of land to make land and 
water areas available to the public for 
recreational purposes by limiting their 
liability toward persons entering thereon 
for those purposes. 
57-14-3. Owner owes no duty of care 
or to give warning-Exceptions. 
Except as specifically provided in 
Subsections (1) and (2) of §57-14-6, 
an owner of land owes no duty of care 
to keep the premises safe for entry or 
use by any person using the premises for 
any recreational purpose, or to give any 
warning of a dangerous condition, use, 
structure, or activity on those premises 
to those persons. 57-14-4. Owner's 
permitting another to use land without 
charge-Effect. 
Except as specifically provided in 
Subsection (1) of §57-14-6, an owner 
of land who either directly or indirectly 
invites or permits without charge any 
person to use the land for any recreati-
onal purpose does not thereby: 
(1) make any representation or extend 
any assurance that the premises are safe 
for any purpose; 
(2) confer upon the person the legal 
status of an invitee or licensee to whom 
a duty of care is owed; 
(3) assume responsibility for or incur 
liability for any injury to persons or 
property caused by an act or omission 
of the person or any other person who 
enters upon the land; or 
(4) owe any duty to curtail his [or her) 
use of his [or her] land during its use for • 
recreational purposes. 
57-14-6. Liability not limited where 
willful or malicious conduct involved or 
admission fee charged. 
Nothing in this act limits in any way 
any liability which otherwise exists: 
(1) for willful or malicious failure to 
guard or warn against a dangerous 
condition, use, structure, or activity or 
for deliberate, willful, or malicious 
injury to persons or property .... 
U t a h Code A n n . §§57-14-1 to-6 (1986) 
(amended in part 1987 & 1988). 
2. The trial court's decision in Crawford was the 
subject of a lengthy and scholarly law review article. 
See Butler, Outdoor Sports and Torts: An Analysis 
of Utah's Recreational Use Act, 1988 Utah L. Rev. 
47. 
3. It is worth noting that this allegation would not 
be sufficient, even under the weaker "reckless disr-
egard" standard of Clayton v. Crossroads Equip-
mem Co., 655 P.2d 1125 (Utah 1982). 
Cilc as 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
CHRIS & DICK'S LUMBER AND 
H A R D W A R E , a Utah corporation, 
Petitioner, 
v. 
TAX COMMISSION of the State of Utah, 
Respondent. 
No . 880188 
FILED: April 24, 1990 
Original Proceeding in this Court 
A T T O R N E Y S : 
R. LaMar Bishop, Salt Lake City, for 
petitioner 
R. Paul Van Dam, Stephen G. Schwendiman, 
Bryce H . Pettey, Salt Lake City, for 
respondent 
This opinion is subject to revision before 
publication in the Pacific Reporter. 
ZIMMERMAN, Justice: 
Chris & Dick's Lumber and Hardware , 
Inc. , seeks a writ of review of a final decision 
of the Utah State Tax Commission ordering 
Chris & Dick 's to pay a 10 percent penalty, 
plus interest, on over $90,000 due on an unt-
imely filed prepayment of sales tax return. 
Chris & Dick's claims that the penalty was 
improperly assessed under the terms of section 
59-15-5.1 of the code or, alternatively, that 
the language of the statute is so vague as to 
violate the due process clause of the fourte-
enth amendment of the United States Consti-
tut ion. We affirm. 
Section 59-15-5.1 of the code requires 
certain entities to prepay a portion of their 
state and local sales tax liability by June 15th. 
U t a h C o d e A n n . § 5 9 - 1 5 - 5 . 1 ( 1 9 8 5 ) 
( c u r r e n t v e r s i o n at §59-12-108 ( S u p p . 
1989)). Chris & Dick 's , through its accoun-
tant , filed its prepayment return thirty-eight 
days late. The Utah State Tax Commission 
levied a 10 percent penalty against Chris & 
Dick 's under section 59-15-5.1(3), which 
provides in pertinent par t : "In addition to any 
other penalties for late payment provided in 
Section 59-15-5, there shall be a penalty of 
10% of the total amount of the prepayment 
due from the date the prepayment return is 
due . " Utah Code Ann . §59-15-5.1 (1985) 
( c u r r e n t v e r s i o n a t §59-12-108 ( S u p p . 
1989)).1 This penalty was ultimately determ-
ined to be $9,287, plus interest. Upon Chris & 
Dick's mot ion for a formal hearing, the 
commission affirmed the penalty in April 
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Clerk of the Utah Court of Appeals 
230 South 500 East, #400 
Salt Lake City, UT 84102 
RE: John Call Engineering, Inc. v. Manti City 
Case No. 89-0384CA 
Dear Clerk: 
Pursuant to Rule 24 (j) of the Utah Rules of the 
Appellate Procedure, appellant John Call Engineering, Inc. 
submits the following additional authority. The additional 
authority supplements Point III of Appellant's Reply Brief 
Argument. 
A motion in limine is a motion requesting the Court to 
prohibit opposing counsel from referring to or offering evidence 
so highly prejudicial to the moving party that curative 
instructions cannot prevent the predispositional effect on the 
jury. Messier v. Simmon's Gun Specialties Inc., 687 P.2d 121 
(Okla. 1984). The motion also avoids juror bias generated by 
objection to the prejudicial evidence at trial. Davidson v. Beco 
Corp., 733 P.2d 781, 784 (Idaho App. 1986). 
The motion recognizes that the mere asking of 
an improper question in the hearing of the 
jury may prove so prejudicial 'that, 
notwithstanding an instruction by the court 
to disregard the offensive matter, the moving 
party will be denied his right to a fair 
trial. It is the prejudicial effect of the 
questions asked or statement made in 
connection with the offer of evidence and not 
so much the prejudicial effect of the 
evidence itself, that this very practical 
tool was designed to reach. 
Gendron v. Pawtucket Mutual Insurance Co., 409 A.2d 656, 659 (Me. 
1979) . 
FILED 
MiY 1 5 »90 
ROBERT J DEBRY 
G STEVEN SULLIVAN 
WARREN W DRIGGS 
GORDON K JENSEN 
EDWARD T WELLS 
GEORGE T WADDOUPS 
Utah Court of Appeals 
May 15, 1990 
Page Two 
A motion in limine should be granted when two factors 
are present: 1) the evidence is inadmissable; and 2) the offer, 
reference or statements made during trial concerning the evidence 
will tend to prejudice the jury. Whittley v. City of Meridian, 
530 So.2d 1341 (Miss. 1988). State v. Evans, 634 P.2d 845, 847-
48 (Wash. 198]). See, Caserta v. Allstate Insurance Co., 470 
N.E.2d 430, 434-35 (Ohio App. 1983). 
Sincerely, 
ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES 
He-
ROBERT J. DEBRY 
RJD\jn 
cc: Counsel of record 
I . 
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III. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
POINT I - THE UTAH SUPREME COURT DID NOT DIRECT THE TRIAL 
COURT TO DETERMINE WHETHER CALL MITIGATED ITS 
DAMAGES 
The mandate of John Call Engineering, Inc. v. Manti 
City Corporation, 743 P.2d 1205f 1210 (Utah 1987) was Mto 
determine plaintiff's damages and enter judgment in favor of 
Call." Id. The majority opinion did not instruct the lower 
court to determine whether Call mitigated his damages. Only a 
two judge minority concurring opinion suggested that mitigation 
of damages was an issue. A concurring opinion is no direction 
to the lower court. It is only an expression of minority 
views. McGowan v. University of Scranton, 759 F.2d 287 (3d. 
Cir. 1985). 
POINT II - CALL DID NOT HAVE NOTTCE THAT MANTI WOULD RE 
ALLOWED TO AMEND ITS ANSWER TO INCLUDE 
MITIGATION OF DAMAGES AS AN AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
The record establishes that Call had no notice that 
Manti would be allowed to try the mitigation of damages 
affirmative defense. The first trial did not try mitigation of 
damages. Manti never filed a motion to amend its answer. 
Manti did not include any mitigation of damages issue in the 
pre-trial order. 
POINT III - THE RECORD SHOWS THAT THE LOWER COURT ALLOWED 
MANTI TO PRESENT IRRELEVANT AND PREJUDICIAL 
ISSUES AND ARGUMENTS TO THE JURY 
The record establishes that the lower court allowed 
1 
Manti to inject the following false and prejudicial issues into 
the trial: 
1. The contract was in dispute, when in fact, the 
Utah Supreme Court ruled that the only issue was Call' s dam-
ages . 
2. Call was paid for everything he did, so he 
should not be able to recover lost profits. 
3. Call could not proceed without written autho-
rity, an argument rejected by the Utah Supreme Court in this 
very case. 
4. The taxpayers would have to pay Call. 
The lower court did not grant Call's Motion in Lim-
ine, nor sustain the majority of Call 's objections. The Court 
also failed to instruct the jury to disregard the arguments. 
POINT IV - THE LOWER COURT, OVER THE OBJECTIONS OF CALL, 
FAILED TO INSTRUCT THE JURY ON HOW TO CALCULATE 
LOST PROFITS 
In this case, Call submitted three jury instructions 
and a special verdict to tell the jury that lost profits were 
calculated by determining gross receipts that would have been 
earned and subcontracting expenses saved by not performing the 
contract. The Court rejected the jury instructions and the 
special verdict. Call' s legal theory of damages was not 
presented to the jury in a jury instruction. 
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POINT V - FROM THE EVIDENCE SUBMITTED AT TRIAL, IT IS 
IMPOSSIBLE FOR RATIONAL MINDS TO CALCULATE 
CALL'S LOST PROFITS AT LESS THAN $56,000 
Manti did not call any witnesses. Callfs expert wit-
ness testified that Call's lost profits were $136,334. 
The time records of the engineer who replaced Call 
multiplied by Call's contract rates establishes the gross re-
ceipts. Call testified about the expenses he saved. Call 
testified that his damages were more than $106,00 but somewhat 
less than $183,846. 
Averaging Call's profit margins taken from his finan-
cial record establishes lost profits of $70,278. 
Multiplying the gross receipts by the profit margin 
of the engineer who replaced Call establishes lost profits of 
$56,377.60. It is impossible to rationally calculate damages 
in a lesser amount. 
POINT VI - THERE IS NOT ONE IOTA OF TRIAL EVIDENCE TO 
SUPPORT MANTI'S MITIGATION OF DAMAGES AFFIRMA-
TIVE DEFENSE 
Manti, in its brief, fails to cite to the record one 
iota of evidence to establish that Call did not mitigate 
damages. Manti has the burden of proof to establish the 
mitigation of damages affirmative defense. 
All witnesses called were Call's witnesses. Not one 
of the witnesses furnished any evidence suggesting that Call 
did not mitigate his damages. 
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POINT VII - UNLESS CALL IS AWARDED HIS EXPERT WITNESS FEE 
COSTS
 f HE DOES NOT HAVE A REMEDY FOR MANTI'S 
BREACH, AS GUARANTEED BY ARTICLE I, SECTION 11 
OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTION 
Article If Section 11 of the Utah Constitution guar-
antees to Call "a remedy by due course of law which shall be 
administered without denial . . . " 
Call's case required expert testimony to establish 
lost profits. Expert testimony does not come cheap. Unless 
Call is awarded his expert witness costs, Call has no effective 
legal remedy for Manti's breach. The lower court recognized 
that Call should be awarded his expert witness fee costs. 
You can argue that my personal feeling 
[Judge Tibbs] is expert witness fees in a 
reasonable rate ought to be allowed. 
(Tr. p. 32 line 25, p. 33, line 1.) 
VI. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I - THIS CASE MUST BE REVERSED BECAUSE THE TRIAL 
COURT DID NOT FOLLOW THE UTAH SUPREME COURT'S 
MANDATE. THE UTAH SUPREME COURT DID NOT DIRECT 
THE TRIAL COURT TO DETERMINE WHETHER CALL 
MITIGATED HIS DAMAGES 
A. Introduction. 
Manti alleges that the trial court expressly followed 
"the directions of the Supreme Court by considering mitigation 
evidence" because "when damages are at issue, mitigation is 
always a factor to be considered." (Respondent's brief, p. 9, 
citing no authority.) 
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Manti is clearly wrong. The Utah Supreme Court did 
not direct the trial court to consider the mitigation of 
damages, affirmative defense. Further, the Utah Supreme Court 
has ruled that mitigation of damages is not always a factor to 
be considered when damages are the issue. 
B. The Utah Supreme Court did not direct the trial court to 
consider whether Call mitigated his damages. 
The mandate of John Call Engineering, Inc. v. Manti 
City Corp. , 743 P.2d 1205, 1210 (Utah 1987) was "to determine 
plaintiff's damages, and enter judgment in favor of Call." 
No directions were given to the trial court to try 
any mitigation of damages affirmative defense. A concurring 
opinion of two justices said that "plaintiff's mitigation 
efforts should be evaluated with reasonable care." Call at 
1210. However, a minority concurring opinion is not a mandate 
and it is no direction to the lower court. Nothing is decided 
by a concurring opinion. Boode v. Allied Mutual Co., 458 P.2d 
653 (Wyo. 1969). A concurring opinion is not the opinion of 
the appellate court unless it is joined in by a majority of the 
appellate judges. State v. Dowe, 352 N.W.2d 660 (Wis. 1984). 
In summary, the concurring opinion is only an expression of 
views by a minority of the court and nothing more. McGowan v. 
University of Scranton, 759 F.2d 287 (3d. Cir. 1985). c. f. 
Rule 30(c) of the Rules of the Utah Supreme Court; 
Any justice concurring or dissenting 
therefrom may likewise give his reasons in 
5 
writing and file the same with the clerk. 
In short, the notion that the Utah Supreme Court 
directed the trial court to try an unpled mitigation of damages 
affirmative defense is sheer nonsense. 
C. Mitigation of damages is not always an issue in breach of 
contract cases. 
Without citation to any authority whatsoever, Manti 
argues that the lower court followed the Utah Supreme Court 
mandate because "when damages are at issue, mitigation is 
always a factor." (Respondent's brief, p. 9). 
Manti 's unsupported argument is contrary to Utah law 
in the following particulars: 
1. Mitigation of damages is only an issue, when it 
is affirmatively, pled. Gill v. Timm, 720 P.2d 1352 (Utah 
1986). In this case, Manti never pled mitigation of damages. 
2. Several Utah Supreme Court cases have held that 
mitigation of damages is not an issue in a particular contract 
case. See Hector, Inc. v. United Savings & Loan Ass'n., 741 
P.2d 542 (Utah 1987); Alexander v. Brown, 646 P.2d 692 (Utah 
1982); Double D. Amusement Co. v. Hawkins, 438 P.2d 811 (Utah 
1968) . 
3. In only one case has the Utah Supreme Court 
applied the mitigation of damages affirmative defense to a lost 
profits case. In Utah Farm Production Credit Assoc, v. Cox, 
627 P. 2d 62 (1981), the Utah Supreme Court held that a turkey 
6 
grower voluntarily closed his business and, therefore, could 
not seek lost profits from a lender who reneged on a loan. 
Utah Farm Production Credit is a far cry from this case. Call 
stayed in business. He did not voluntarily quit anything. In 
a case like Call, the measure of damages is determined by the 
difference between gross receipts and the expenses which would 
have been incurred in earning the receipts. Mitigation of 
damages is not an issue. 
D. The lower court's failure to follow the mandate is rever-
sible error. 
When a judgment is rendered and remanded with special 
instructions, (as was the case in Call) , the lower court is 
bound to follow those instructions. Hidden Development Co. v. 
Miles, 590 P.2d 1244 (Utah 1979). 
POINT II - CALL DID NOT HAVE NOTICE THAT MANTI WOULD BE 
ALLOWED TO AMEND ITS ANSWER TO INCLUDE MITI-
GATION OF DAMAGES AS AN AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
A. Introduction. 
Manti, in its brief, argues that Call was not 
prejudiced by the court allowing Manti to amend its answer 
because Call had notice that mitigation of damages was a trial 
issue. Manti's argument is contrary to the record. 
B. The record in this case conclusively establishes that 
Call did not have notice that Manti would seek to try 
the mitigation of damages affirmative defense. 
Any examination of the record of this case conclusively 
establishes that Call did not have notice that Manti would at-
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tempt to try mitigation of damages. Manti's answer to plain-
tiff's complaint does not plead mitigation of damages. 
Further, Call submitted comprehensive interrogatories to Manti 
to discover the factual basis for Manti's affirmative defenses. 
The answers, copies attached in the addendum, show no indica-
tion whatsoever that Manti would seek to try the affirmative 
defense of mitigation of damages. The record also reveals that 
Manti did not attempt to amend its pleadings prior to the first 
trial. 
The first trial occurred in April of 1984. Call put 
on a complete case including damages. An examination of the 
trial transcript reveals that Manti did not try mitigation of 
damages. Manti did not ask any mitigation of damages ques-
tions on direct or in cross-examination. 
For the second trial, Judge Tibbs ordered the parties 
to prepare and file a pre-trial order. The parties did so. 
The pre-trial order, copy attached in the addendum, shows that 
mitigation of damages was not a trial issue. 
The second trial commenced on January 13, 1989. 
Still Manti made no motion to amend its answer. 
Prior to trial, Call made a motion in limine to 
exclude evidence of mitigation of damages. Manti had not moved 
to amend its answer and Call was not willing to let mitigation 
of damages be tried by Call 's express or implied consent pur-
suant to Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 15(b). The court chose 
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to hear Call's Motion in Limine after the jury was impanelled. 
Only after the court heard and denied Call's Motion in Limine 
did Manti move to amend its answer by alleging the mitigation 
of damages affirmative defense. (Tr.p. 72.) 
In short, from the first day of the litigation until 
after the jury was impaneled, neither the pleadings, the re-
sponses to discovery nor the pre-trial order placed Call on 
any notice whatsoever that Manti would try the mitigation of 
damages affirmative defense. 
C. Call was prejudiced. 
Call's opening brief, cites to the record wherein the 
court and Manti's counsel effectively acknowledged that Call 
was prejudiced by the court's injection of the mitigation of 
damages defense into the trial. 
Manti, responds that Call was not prejudiced because 
Manti's strategy was to rely on cross examination rather than 
calling its own witnesses. (Brief of respondent, p. 14.) 
Manti's brief misses the point. As shown in Point VI 
of this brief, Manti failed to meet its burden of proof that 
Call failed to mitigate his damages. However, Call was preju-
diced because the court, by allowing the amendment, also 
allowed Manti to argue mitigation of damages in its opening 
argument (Tr. p. 83). The Court followed up with a confusing 
jury instruction telling the jury that Call had a duty to cut 
his losses. (Jury instruction No. 21.) 
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In summary, Call was prejudiced in the following 
ways : 
1. Manti argued to the jury that Call did not 
mitigate his damages, even though no evidence was submitted by 
Manti either directly or on cross examination that Call did not 
mitigate damages. 
2. The court, over the objection of Call (Tr. 306) 
told the jury that Call had a duty to cut his losses. The 
jury instruction lacked a factual basis. c.f. Powers v. Gene's 
Building Materials, Inc., 567 P.2d 174 (Utah 1977). 
3. Because the amendment was not sought nor granted 
until after the impanelling of the jury, neither Call nor his 
witnesses were prepared to try the mitigation of damages issue. 
This case cries out for reversal. If it is not rever-
sed, any defendant, after a jury is impanelled, can seek to 
amend his answer by alleging a new undisclosed affirmative 
defense. And if the judge grants the motion, the affirmative 
defense will be tried, despite the fact that Utah Rule of 
Civil Procedure 15(b) allows trial amendments only by the 
express or implied consent of the parties. In this case, Call 
did not consent to trying any mitigation of damages defense. 
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POINT III - THIS CASE MUST BE REVERSED BECAUSE THE 
LOWER COURT ALLOWED MANTI TO PRESENT 
IRRELEVANT AND PREJUDICIAL ISSUES AND 
ARGUMENTS TO THE JURY 
A. Introduction. 
At trial and prior to the taking of testimony, Call 
made a motion in limine seeking to exclude evidence and argu-
ment on two irrelevant and prejudicial issues: (1) whether 
Call should be paid for work not performed; and (2) whether the 
judgment could be paid out of the taxpayers' pockets. The 
trial court denied the motion but stated it would sustain 
objections. (Tr. p.22, 67, 71.) 
The trial court's denial of the Motion in Limine in-
vited Manti to inject prejudicial arguments and issues into 
the trial. Manti accepted the invitation, arguing: 
1. The contract was in dispute when, in fact, the 
Utah Supreme Court had held that the only issue was Call's 
damages. 
2. Call was paid for everything he did so he should 
not recover lost profits. 
3. Call could not proceed without written authori-
ty; an argument rejected by the Utah Supreme Court. 
4. The taxpayers would have to pay Call's judgment. 
Manti argues that Call's allegations are baseless and 
that no damage was done because the lower court sustained 
Call's objections. Manti is wrong on both counts. 
11 
B. The record shows that Manti presented falser irrelevant, 
and prejudicial issues and arguments to the jury, 
1. The "contract was in dispute" issue. 
In Manti's opening statement, Manti's counsel argued 
to the jury that the contract was in dispute. 
This contract that's in dispute, folks is 
one that goes back to May of 1981. 
(Tr. p. 79, lines 15-16.) 
The foregoing argument was false and prejudicial. 
Call established that Manti and Call had a contract for 
engineering services; that Call had satisfactorily performed 
up to the time of Manti's breach; and that Manti, without 
excuse, breached the engineering service contract with Call by 
hiring another engineer. John Call Engineering, Inc. v. Manti 
City Corp., 743 P.2d 1205 (Utah 1987). 
Contrary to Manti's brief, the trial court did not 
sustain Call's objection to the foregoing remarks. 
Well its preliminary. I think it's prelim-
inary to put the parties in the respective 
positions. The objection is overruled. 
(Tr. p. 80, lines 10-12.) 
2. The "Call was paid for everything he did" issue. 
In Manti's opening statement, Manti's counsel stated: 
Mr. Call investigated and prepared a design 
for a sewer system in Manti and was paid 
the $22,000 . . . was paid for that 
service. 
(Tr. p. 81, lines 1-4.) 
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After the design stage was completed by Mr. 
Call and he was paid approximately $22,000, 
Mr. Call provided no further engineering 
services to Manti City. 
(Tr. p. 82, line 35; p. 83 lines 1-2.) 
The foregoing statements were prejudicial because the 
message to the jury was that Call had been paid for everything 
he did, so he was not damaged. Such an argument is contrary to 
Utah law which provides for an award of lost profits. e.g. 
Cook Associates v. Warnick, 664 P.2d 1161 (Utah 1983). 
3. The "Call could not proceed without written authority" 
issue. 
During the cross examination of Call, Manti's 
counsel, relying on a clause in the contract, attempted to show 
to the jury that Call Engineering would not perform services 
without written authority. 
Q. You wouldn't do it [any right of way 
work] unless you got together with 
Manti and had specific written author-
ization? 
(Tr. p. 210, lines 11-13.) 
Q. [S]urveying couldn't be done without 
written authorization from Manti City 
either, could it? 
(Tr. 210, lines 19-20.) 
Q. [Referring to the contract addendum] 
[d]o you get that from this provision 
of the contract, the middle paragraph 
that says: "the engineer will not 
proceed with additional phases of the 
project until authorization from the 
Owner?" 
(Tr. p. 212, lines 9-12.) 
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The foregoing quotes were prejudicial, irrelevant and 
planted false ideas with the jury. During the first trial and 
appeal, Manti took the position that Call could not proceed 
without written authorization. That argument was forcefully 
rejected by the Utah Supreme Court in Call I; 
The addendum did not provide a reason 
whereby Manti City could choose to proceed 
with the project avoid the valid agreement 
and hire another engineer. 
Call at 1209. 
Again, contrary to Manti's brief, the trial court did 
not sustain Call's objections. 
Mr. Gardiner: Objection, Your Honor. The 
Utah Supreme Court has already construed 
that contract provision . . . and Mr. 
Frischknecht knows that. 
The Court: I don't know what it is. May I 
see it please? 
Mr. Gardiner: I direct the Court to the 
Utah Supreme Court's opinion on that very 
issue. 
The Court: Well, the objection is noted and 
overruled. 
(Tr. p. 211, lines 1-11.) 
4. The "Taxpayer would have to pay Call" issue. 
In closing arguments, Manti's counsel told the jury 
that taxpayers would have to pay any judgment awarded to Call. 
(Tr. p. 318, lines 10-16.) 
Call's counsel quickly objected. 
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Your Honor, I object to this. This is 
prejudicial. It's an absolute appeal to 
the taxpayers' prejudice in this case, 
(Tr. p. 318, lines 13-16.) 
The court sustained the objection. However, the 
Court did not tell the jury that they were not to consider 
whether the judgment was to be paid from the taxpayers' pocket. 
The objection is sustained. Ladies and 
gentlemen of the jury, Manti City is the 
defendant in this action. Not you. 
(Tr. p. 318, lines 17-19.) 
The Court's failure to properly admonish the jury is 
reversible error. Annot. Counsel's Appeal in Civil Case to 
Self-interest or Prejudice of Jurors as Taxpayers, as a Ground 
for Mistrial, New Trial or Reversal, 93 A.L.R.3d 556 (1979.) 
C. Conclusion. 
Contrary to Manti's responding brief, Call's allega-
tion that Manti's counsel injected irrelevant and prejudicial 
issues into the trial are not baseless. Further, the court did 
not sustain the objections and admonish the jury as to the true 
facts and correct legal principles involved. The Court's fail-
ure to do so is reversal error. 
POINT TV - THIS CASE MUST BE REVERSED BECAUSE THE LOWER 
COURT FAILED TO INSTRUCT THE JURY ON HOW TO 
CALCULATE LOST PROFITS. 
In this case, Call sought lost profits resulting 
from Manti's breach of the engineering services contract. 
Lost profits are determined by computing the dif-
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ference between the gross receipts that would have been re-
ceived but for the breach, less the expenses saved by not 
having to perform the contract, Cook Associates v. Warnick, 
664 P.2d 1161 (Utah 1983); Acculoq, Inc. v. Peterson, 692 P.2d 
728 (Utah 1984); Sawyers v. FMA Co., 722 P.2d 773 (Utah 1986). 
Call submitted two proposed jury instructions to 
assist the jury in calculating lost profits, instructions No. 
8, and No. 12. 
Instruction No. 8 told the jury the contract rates 
Manti agreed to pay Call for services rendered. Only by taking 
the rates and multiplying them by the hours Call would have 
earned on the contract, could the jury determine the gross 
receipts, the first element requisite to determining lost 
profits. The Court refused the instruction. 
Call also submitted jury instruction no. 12 and amen-
ded jury instruction No. 12. These instructions set forth the 
Utah Supreme Court's formula for calculating lost profits. 
These jury instructions were also rejected by the Court. 
Manti's brief argues that the instructions taken as a 
whole were adequate. (Respondent's brief, p. 16.) 
Manti's assertion is nonsense. For jury instructions 
to be adequate, the applicable principle of law must correctly 
be presented to the jury in a clear and understandable manner. 
Wellman v. Noble, 12 U.2d 350, 366 P.2d 701 (Utah 1961). The 
court is required to instruct the jury on how to measure 
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damages and to tell the jury the elements for which damages can 
be awarded. Judd v. Rowley's Cherry Hill Orchard, Inc., 611 
P.2d 1216 (Utah 1980); City of Phoenix v. Wade, 428 P.2d 450 
(Ariz. App. 1967); c.f. Dixon v. Stewart, 658 P.2d 591 (Utah 
1982) . 
The jury instructions, without Call's proposed in-
structions 8, 12, and special verdict form, provided no assis-
tance to the jury on how to calculate the lost profits. The 
jury instructions also failed to present Call's damage legal 
theory. The failure to give the instructions was reversible 
error requiring a new trial. Startin v. Madsen, 237 P. 2d 834 
(1951); Hardman v. Thurman, 239 P.2d 215 (1951). 
POINT V - FROM THE EVIDENCE SUBMITTED AT TRIAL, IT IS 
IMPOSSIBLE FOR RATIONAL MINDS TO CALCULATE 
CALL'S DAMAGES AT LESS THAN $56,000 
In this action, Call seeks lost profits. Lost 
profits may be established by: 
1. Expert opinions. Cook Associates v. Warnick, 
664 P.2d 1161 (Utah 1983); or 
2. Evidence of gross receipts that would have been 
received less expenses that would have been incurred. Acculog, 
Inc. v. Peterson, 692 P.2d 728 (Utah 1984); Sawyers v. FMA 
Leasing Co., 722 P.2d 773 (Utah 1986); or 
3. Records and testimony of a similar business 
owner. Cook, supra. Call put on all three types of 
evidence. Each type of evidence shows that Call sustained 
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damages of at least $56,000. Manti put on no evidence to rebut 
Call' s evidence. (Tr. p. 315-316.) Call made a motion for a 
directed verdict and for a judgment notwithstanding the 
verdict. Both motions were denied. 
In Call ' s opening brief, Call argued it was 
impossible to rationally calculate lost profits of less than 
$56,000. Manti responded by taking the $56,000 figure and 
subtracting $22,000 paid to Call, for previous work. Manti 
then says the jury could have found that Call did not mitigate 
his damages, so the $13,440 verdict is justified. (Respondent's 
brief p.22.) 
There are two problems with Manti's hypothesis. 
First, the $22,000 cannot be deducted from the $56,000. Call 
contracted with Manti to do an engineering service contract. 
The first phase of the contract called for a preliminary 
report. Call at 1207. Call completed phase I and was paid 
$22,000. Thurgood Engineering was then hired by Manti. 
Thurgood completed the other phases of the contract. The 
$56,000 figure was obtained by taking the gross receipts 
(Call's contract rate times Thurgood's hours) and multiplying 
it by Thurgood's profit margin. There is no rational reason 
for deducting the $22,000 Call was paid for work not duplicated 
by the replacement engineer. 
There is also no rational reason for deducting any 
amount for failure to mitigate damages. More importantly, 
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there is no evidence to support any made-up deduction. See 
Point VI of this Brief, 
In summary, the unimpeached and uncontroverted 
evidence shows that Call's lost profits cannot be less than 
$56,000. 
POINT VI - THERE IS NOT ONE IOTA OF EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT 
MANTI'S MITIGATION OF DAMAGES AFFIRMATIVE 
DEFENSE 
With little or no citation to the record, the theme 
of Respondent's Brief is that the jury accepted Manti fs 
mitigation of damages affirmative defense. (e.g. Respondent's 
Brief p. 22.) Manti's failure to cite to the record is not 
surprising. There is nothing in the record supporting a miti-
gation of damages affirmative defense. 
Mitigation of damages is, pure and simple, an affir-
mative defense. Gill v. Timm, 720 P.2d 1352 (Utah 1986); Pratt 
v. Board of Education, 564 P.2d 294 (Utah 1977). 
The affirmative defense burden of proof is on the 
party asserting it. It is up to the defendant to prove that a 
plaintiff failed to mitigate his damages. Pratt v. Board of 
Utah County School District, 564 P.2d 294 (Utah 1977). The 
defendant must prove each and every fact material to his affir-
mative defense. Pacific Insurance Co. of New York v. Frank, 
452 P.2d 794 (Okla. 1969); Wendell v. Foley, 594 P.2d 750 (N.M. 
App. 1979). 
In this case, Manti freely admits it did not call any 
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witnesses nor present any evidence of its own on the mitigation 
of damages issue. It relied solely on cross examination. 
[I]nstead of producing numerous witnesses 
or evidence of its own regarding mitiga-
tion, Respondent's trial strategy relied on 
cross examination of appellant's own wit-
nesses . 
(Respondent's Brief p. 14.) 
However, a review of the trial transcript shows that 
Manti failed to present any evidence, on cross examination, or 
otherwise, that Call failed to mitigate his damages. Mitiga-
tion of damages means only that: 
[Tjhe aggrieved party [to a contract] may 
not, either by action or inaction aggravate 
the injury occasioned by the breach, but 
has a duty to actively mitigate his 
damages. 
Utah Farm Production Credit Assoc, v. Cox, 627 P.2d 62 (Utah 
1981); see Angelos v. First Interstate Bank of Utah, 671 P.2d 
772 (Utah 1983); DeBry & Hilton Travel v. Capitol Interna-
tional Airways, 583 P.2d 1181 (Utah 1978). 
In this case, there is no evidence that Call aggrava-
ted the injury either by action or inaction. 
The witnesses called at trial were: 
David Thurgood - The engineer hired by Manti to 
replace Call. 
Randy Peterson - Call's CPA. 
Charles Peterson - Call's economic consultant; and 
John Call - Principal of Call Engineering. 
Manti' s counsel did not ask any questions about 
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mitigation of damages to David Thurgood or Randy Peterson. 
Further, the few questions asked by Manti's counsel to John 
Call conclusively shows that Call did not aggravate the damages 
either by action or inaction: 
Q. [S]o on the 23rd of March 1982, when you became 
aware of the problems [Manti's breach], what did 
your firm do? 
A, Well, I wrote a letter, I think to you, to 
respond and indicated that the contract was 
still in force. 
Q. In 1982, Mr. Call, did you provide any engineer-
ing services to anyone? 
A. Oh, sure. 
Q. So, since March 23rd of 1982, when you became 
aware of the problems with the contract, your 
engineering firm went forward and you continued 
to do other work. . .and your revenue, ranged 
from $150,000 to over $300,000 for each of the 
years since 1981. 
A. That's correct, except. . .1982. That was a 
down year. 
(Tr. of Proceedings p. 242 lines 3-9; p. 243 lines 14-19, 23.) 
In short, Call continued in business after Manti's 
breach. There is no showing that Call aggravated the damages 
caused by Manti's breach, either by action or inaction. 
Further, the evidence conclusively showed that Call 
did not recover the lost profits, flowing from Manti's breach 
in 1982. 
A. 1982. That was a down year. 
Q. Was there ever a time from 1982 to 1985 that 
your firm didn't have the capacity to do Manti 
project, as well as the work you were doing? 
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A. No, We could have done that, 
(Tr. p. 245 lines 13-16.) 
The only other witness who testified on the mitiga-
tion of damages issue was the economic consultant. He testified 
that Call's gross revenues for 1982, the year the contract was 
breached, were $314,000, but that Call had the capacity to 
gross an additional $240,000 in revenue. (Tr. p. 282 lines 7-
14.) Of course, Call did not generate that extra revenue 
because Manti breached the engineering service contract. 
Call's lost profits were $136,324 (Tr, p. 278, lines 208.) 
In summary, mitigation of damages is an affirmative 
defense. There is nothing in the record suggesting that Call 
aggravated the contract damages. The same evidence shows that 
Call did not regain the lost profits. Manti did not call any 
witnesses of its own. There is no evidence, none, that proves 
that Call failed to mitigate damages. 
POINT VII - UNLESS CALL IS AWARDED HIS EXPERT WITNESSES FEE 
COSTS, HE DOES NOT HAVE A REMEDY BY DUE COURSE 
OF LAW, AS GUARANTEED BY ARTICLE I SECTION 11 OF 
THE UTAH CONSTITUTION 
Manti argues that prior cases have denied expert 
witness fee costs. However, not one of those cases considered 
whether denying expert witness fee costs in a complex contract 
case denies a plaintiff a remedy as guaranteed by Article I 
Section 11 of the Utah Constitution. 
Article I Section 11 of the Utah Constitution guaran-
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tees to citizens, including CaJLL, the following rights: 
All courts shall be open, and every person 
for an injury done to him in his person, 
property or reputation shall have remedy by 
due course of law which shall be 
administered without denial. . . . 
Thirty-three states have open court's constitutional 
provisions similar to Utah's. Berry v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 
717 P.3d 670 (Utah 1985). The open court's provisions 
originated with the "Magna Carta." Ld. at 674. The open 
court's guarantee applies to judicial as well as legislative 
action. e.g. Saylor v. Hall, 497 S.W.2d 218 (Ky.App. 1973). 
The open court's clauses are designed to accomplish several 
purposes. "The clear language of the section guarantees access 
to the courts" to obtain a remedy. Berry, at 675. A primary 
purpose of these provisions is to assail the once existing evil 
of paying fines to the king and his officers for delaying or 
expediting lawsuits or for obtaining justice. Swann v. Kidd, 
79 Ala. 431 (1885); or to prevent justice from being equated 
with affluence. 
The plain and simple fact is that although Call won 
in the lower court, unless he is granted his expert witness fee 
costs of $9,812.54, he is denied a remedy because his award is 
eaten up by necessarily incurred witness fee costs. Others 
like Call will be effectively denied access to the court and a 
remedy. Justice will be equated with affluence. 
Manti, in its brief, concludes that if the law (re-
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garding witness fee awards) should be rewritten, this is cer-
tainly not the case for it. Manti' s conclusion is contrary to 
that of the trial court judge. 
[N]ow there's a Supreme Court decision 
saying I can't award expert witness fees, 
and it seems to me that for me to come to a 
contrary conclusion is just ridiculous. 
However. . .personally, I've always felt 
just like you. . .but I'm not going to rule 
that way. But I put it on the record, and 
you can go up and if you are arguing the 
rest of it, you can argue that my personal 
feeling is expert witness fees in a 
reasonable rate ought to be allowed. 
You've got my statement on the record how I 
personally feel about it. (Emphasis 
added.) 




The record in this case shows that the lower court's 
verdict and judgment must be increased to $56,377 or a new 
trial held on the issue of Call' s damages. The remedy shows 
that the lower court: 
1. Did not follow the Utah Supreme Court's mandate; 
2. Was not directed by the Utah Supreme Court to 
try any mitigation of damages affirmative defense; 
3. Prejudiced Call by allowing a pleading amendment 
after the jury was impanelled; 
4. Prejudiced Call by revoking a trial continuance; 
5. Allowed Manti to present false and prejudicial 
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arguments; and 
6. Failed to instruct the jury on how to calculate 
lost profits. 
The record also shows there is no evidence supporting 
the notion that Call did not mitigate his damages. Further, 
Call did not have notice that mitigation of damages was a 
trial issue. 
Finally, unless Call is granted his expert witness 
costs, he is denied a judicial remedy for Manti's breach of 
contract. 
DATED this day of February, 1990. 
ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
... M/Jk 
ROBERT J. DEBRY 
DALE F. GARDINER 
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Paul R. Frischknecht 
Attorney for Defendant\Respondent 
50 North Main Street 
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50 North Main Street
 %^tt^t^LJ&:^'^ 
Manti, Utah 84642 * ~//l"/- ?3 
Telephone: 835-4391 
IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR 
SANPETE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
JOHN CALL ENGINEERING INC., 
a Utah Corporation, ANSWER TO PLAINTIFFS 
INTERROGATORIES 
Plaintiff, 
vs. Civil No, 8606 
MANTI CITY CORPORATION, 
a Municipal Corporation, 
Defendant. 
Comes now the defendant by and through their counsel 
and answers the Interrogatories submitted by the plaintiff 
in the above entitled matter as follows: 
INTERROGATORIES 
1. Describe in reasonable detail the factual basis 
for your first defense, that plaintiff's complaint fails 
to state a cause of action upon which relief can be granted. 
Answer: Utah Code Annotate'd, Section 63-30-1 et. 
al. denies recovery. 
2. Describe in reasonable detail the factual basis 
for your second defense, that plaintiff's claim is barred 
by U.C.A. 63-30-1 et. al. 
Answer: Utah Code Annotated, Section 63-30-1 et. 
al. grants immunity from suit against a political subdivision. 
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3. Describe in reasoanble detail the factual basis 
for your third defense, that there has been an accord and 
satisfaction. 
Answer: Plaintiff was paid in excess of $22,000.00 
as work he performed. 
4. Describe in reasonable detail all services that 
you claim plaintiff has rendered for you pursuant to the 
contract attached to the complaint in this case. 
Answer: The plaintiff, John Call Engineering was 
engaged by defendant Manti City Corp. to conduct a sewer 
study on the installation of a sewer in Manti City. 
5. Itemize all payments you claim to have made for 
the services described in Interrogatory 4 above. 
Answer: See Attachment #1. 
6. Have you employed anyone to perform services 
described in the contract attached to the complaint in 
this case? 
Answer: Yes. 
7. If so: 
(a) — Describe in reasonable detail the services 
performed, and; 
(b) — Itemize all payments made for those services. 
Answer: Following the release of Call Engineering 
by Manti City, (referenced letter from Manti City signed 
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by Paul Frischknecht, dated March 22, 1982 and letter to 
Call Engineering signed by Mayor Robert Bessey dated April 
23, 1982); Manti City then engaged Thurgood and Associates 
to conduct a sewer study. (See attached copies of Sewer 
Contracts with Thurgood and Associates labeled descriptive 
attachment for Page 6, Item 7a). 
See attachment #2 — payments made to Thurgood and 
Associates. 
8. Identify every person to defendant's knowledge 
who was present at the May 6, 1981 Manti City Council meeting. 
Answer: Review of the minutes of the May 6, 1981 
Manti City Council meeting lists the following persons 
present: 
Mayor Ben Kjar; Councilman Robert Bessey; Councilman 
Bryan McArthur; Councilman Lionel Kind, Councilman Stan 
Voorhees, Councilman Jay Cluff and City Recorder William 
A. Mickelson. Citizens present before the discussion with 
John Call, Mr. Lynn Cox, citizens present after the discussion 
with John Call included Mr. Lynn Cox and Mr. Wilbur Lund. 
9. Describe in reasonable detail the following: 
(a) — The substance of all discussions at the May 
6, 1981 Manti City Council meeting regarding the subject 
of contracting with plaintiff; 
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(b) — Those who took part in those discussions; 
(c) — What each person said during the discussion. 
Answer: Reference copy of minutes May 6, 1981^ copy 
attached hereto. 
10. Identify any statement, conversation or other 
communication,/oral or written.^between plaintiff and any 
officer of defendant concerning the subject matter of the 
contract attached to the complaint in this case, including: 
(a) — The time of such communication; 
(b) — The place of such communication; 
(c) — The persons present at the time and place 
of such communication; 
(d) — The substance of such communication. 
Answer: Reference attached copies of written communications 
and minutes of the City Council meetings of November 18, 
1981, February 9, 1982, February 17, 1982 and March 3, 
1982. 
11. Identify every written statement of a witness 
or party about the subject matter of the contract attached 
to the complaint in this case, including: 
(a) — The time such statement was made: 
(b) — The place of such statement; 
(c) — The person who took such statement; 
(d) — The substance of such statement. 
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Answer: None to our knowledge, with the exception 
of those in Item #10 above. 
12. Identify every document referring to or relating 
to the subject matter of the contract attached to the complaint 
in this case. 
Answer: Reference attached copies of the minutes, 
letters and memorandums. 
13. Identify every witness you intend to call at 
trial, and summarize in reasonable detail the testimony 
you expect them to give. 
Answer: Ben Kjar, Robert Bessey, Bryan McArthur, 
Lionel King, Stan Voorhees, Jay Cluff, and William Mickelson. 
Each will testify they did not read the agreement 
and understood the agreement presented to them was limited 
to sewer study purposes only. 
14. Identify each exhibit you intend to introduce 
into evidence at trial. 
Answer: Those exhibits attached to this 
set of interrogatories will be introduced at trial. If 
others are determined to be used, such information will 
be made known before the time of trial. 
DATED this 3/ <Iay of October, 1983. 
PAUL R. PRISCHKNEGHT 
Attorney for the Defendant 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct 
copy of the above and foregoing Interrogatories to: 
Robert J. DeBry, Esq. 
Attorney at Law 
965 East 4800 South, Suite 2 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84117 
postage prepaid thereon, thisl «^V/ /n oa^ o^ . October, 
1983. 
DALE F. GARDINER -A114 7 
ROBERT J. DEBRY - A084 9 
ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
4001 South 700 East, Suite 500 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84117 
Telephone: (801) 262-8915 
IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR 
SANPETE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
JOHN CALL ENGINEERING, INC., ] 
a Utah corporation, ; 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
MANTI CITY CORPORATION, 
a municipal corporation, 
Defendant. 
PRETRIAL ORDER 
Civil No. 8606 
l JUDGE DON V. TIBBS 
IT IS ORDERED: 
I. 
This is an action for damages caused by defendant 
Manti City corporation's breach of an engineering service 
contract with plaintiff John Call Engineering, Inc. 
II. 
POSSIBILITY OF SETTLEMENT 
The parties have discussed settlement and are approx-
imately $95,000 apart on their respective offers. 
F I I F nnpv 
I I I . 
CQKTEKTIQK OF THE PARTIES 
(A) Admitted Fac t s and I s s u e s . 
(1) T h i s C o u r t has j u r i s d i c t i o n over t he 
p a r t i e s ; 
(2) Venue is proper; 
(3) Plaintiff is a consulting engineering firm; 
(4) Defendant is a Utah municipality; 
(5) On or about May 6, 1981, the parties 
entered into an engineering services contract for the study, 
design and supervising of construction of a sewer system for 
the defendant. The contract is Exhibit 1 previously admitted 
into evidence with this Court. 
(6) Plaintiff performed phase I of the contract 
and presented the preliminary study report to Kanti City in 
October 1981. 
(7) Defendant paid plaintiff approximately 
$22,000 for completing the services called for in Phase I of 
the contract. 
(8) Subsequently, defendant Manti City breached 
the contract PY declaring the contract null and void and by 
hiring the engineering firm of Thurgood and Associates to 
design and supervise the construction of the sewer system, 
which they did. 
(9) The cost of the completed sewer system was 
$2,096,883.63. 
(10) The amount paid to Thurgood and Associates 
Engineering for services performed on the sewer project was 
$186,400.00. 
(11) Call was in compliance with the contract up 
until the time Manti breached the contract. The purpose of 
this trial is to determine the amount of damages. 
(12) Judgment is to be entered in favor of the 
plaintiff in an amount determined by the jury. 
IV. 
The reservations as to the facts cited in Paragraph 
III or as follows: None. 
V. 
The following facts, though not admitted, are not to 
be contested at the trial by evidence to the contrary: None. 
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VI. 
The following issues of fact and no other remain to 
be litigated upon the trial: 
a) The amount of damages sustained by the 
plaintiff by reason of defendant's breach of the contract. 
VII. 
The exhibits to be offered at the trial, together 
with a statement of all admissions, by and all issues between 
the parties with respect thereto are as follows: 
A) Plaintiff's exhibits: 
(1) All trial exhibits previously admitted into 
evidence by the Court, that the Court rules 
are relevant to the issue of damages; 
(2) The contract entered into between Thurgood 
& Associates and Manti City; 
(3) The project time sheets of Thurgood and 
Associates on the sewer project; 
(4) The project time summary prepared by 
Thurgood and Associates; 
(5) Plaintiff's financial records for 1981-84 
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and 1979-81, if plaintiff can reasonably 
locate them; 
(6) Randy Peterson's projection of gross 
receipts that would have been paid to Call 
pursuant to the contracts; 
(7) Thurgood and Associates's invoices to Manti 
City for the sewer project; 
(8) Plaintiff's calculations as to the amount 
of net profits plaintiff would have 
received on the contract; 
(9) An updated lost profits analysis performed 
by Frank Stuart and Associates. 
Defendant has no objection to exhibits identified in 
paragraphs (1)/ (2), (3), and (4), above and stipulate that 
they may be admitted into evidence. Defendant reserves his 
objections to exhibits 5-9 above. 
(B) Defendant's exhibits: Defendant does not 
anticipate using any exhibits other than pliantiff's exhibits 
identified above. 
VIII. 
The following issues of law, and no other, remain to 
be litigated upon the trial. 




This matter is set for/»trial on Thursday, January 12, 
1989, at 10:00 a.m. Estimated time of trial is two days. 
X. 
WITNESSES 





Plaintiff may call as witnesses: 
Frank Stuart 
Brandon Tuttle 
Rebuttal witnesses if needed and not anticipated 
at this time. 
Defendant will call as witnesses: 
David Thurgood, and rebuttal witnesses as needed 
and not anticipated at this time. 
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XI. 
Discovery is complete. 
XII. 
The foregoing admissions have been made by the 
parties, and the parties having specified the foregoing issues 
of fact and law remaining to be litigated, this order shall 
supplement the pleadings and govern the Court of this case, 
unless modified to prevent manifest injustice. 
DATED this day of , 1989. 
BY THE COURT: 
DISTRICT JUDGE 
ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES 
Bv jfltb^MjU* 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
PAUL FREISCHNECHT 
Attorney for Defendant 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing PRETRIAL ORDER (John Call Engineering, Inc., vs. 
Manti City Corporation) , was mailed this /flflday of January, 
1989, by depositing same in the U.S. Mail, postage prepaid, to 
the following: 
PAUL R. FRISCHKNECHT 
Attorney for the Defendant 
50 North Main Street 
Manti, Utah 84642 
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